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FOREWORD: THE LEGACY OF ST. GEORGE TUCKER
DAVISON M. DOUGLAS*
St. George Tucker was one of the more influential jurists, legal
scholars, and legal educators of late-eighteenth- and early-
nineteenth-century America.' The purpose of this symposium is to
examine the impact of Tucker's legal work on the development of
American law and its importance to contemporary scholars and
courts in understanding the contours of legal thought in the early
national period.
Born in Bermuda in 1752, Tucker migrated to Virginia in 1772 to
study at The College of William and Mary.2 After a brief tenure at
the College, Tucker read law under the direction of Williamsburg
attorney George Wythe, one of the most eminent lawyers in the
American colonies and a mentor to many prominent young men,
including Thomas Jefferson.3 Because of the onset of the American
* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, College of William and Mary School of Law.
1. Paul Carrington has written that Tucker"was arguably the most important American
legal scholar of the first half of the nineteenth century." Paul D. Carrington, The
Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 540 (1990).
Though James Kent and Joseph Story would surely compete for that honor, Tucker was
certainly the most important legal scholar in early nineteenth-century America.
2. CHARLES T. CULLEN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER AND LAW IN VIRGINIA, 1772-1804, at 3, 5
(1987) (published version of 1971 Ph.D. dissertation).
3. Id. at 9-10; Davison M. Douglas, The Jeffersonian Vision of Legal Education, 51 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 185, 200 (2001). In 1780, Wythe became the first law professor at The College
1111
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Revolution, in which Tucker served as a member of the Virginia
militia, Tucker did not begin his law practice until 1782. He quickly
became one of Virginia's leading lawyers, and in 1788, the state
legislature appointed him to a position on the recently reorganized
General Court. Tucker served as a judge on the General Court until
1804, when the state legislature elevated him to a seat on the
Virginia Court of Appeals. Tucker resigned from the Court of
Appeals in 1811, but President James Madison appointed him to
the federal district court in Virginia in 1813, a position he held until
1824. Although Tucker was one of the most distinguished jurists of
his day, the presence of two Virginians on the United States
Supreme Court-Chief Justice John Marshall and Associate Justice
Bushrod Washington-likely deprived him of the chance to serve on
the nation's highest court.4
In addition to his judicial career, Tucker made his mark as an
important legal scholar and educator. In 1790, Tucker succeeded
Wythe, becoming the second law professor at The College of William
and Mary, carrying out his duties between court terms and serving
until 1804. 5 Although he would eventually be eclipsed in
prominence by Joseph Story and James Kent,6 Tucker was the most
significant legal scholar of the early nineteenth century,
particularly after publication of his five-volume edition of William
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England in 1803.'
Blackstone's Commentaries, the most authoritative eighteenth-
century text on English law, was published in England between
1765 and 1769.' First published in America in 1771, with
subsequent republication in 1790 and 1799, Blackstone's
of William and Mary. Id. at 200.
4. Paul Finkelman & David Cobin, Introduction to 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, at
vi-ix (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exch. 1996) (1803) [hereinafterTUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES].
5. CULLEN, supra note 2, at 121. In the 1790s, Tucker also served on a commission to
revise Virginia's laws that resulted in the publication of the commonwealth's first legal code.
Charles F. Hobson, St. George Tucker's Law Papers, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1246
(2006).
6. Robert M. Cover, Book Review, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1475, 1476 (1970).
7. TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 4.
8. Finkelman & Cobin, supra note 4, at i.
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Commentaries soon became the most widely read legal text in late-
eighteenth-century America-essential reading for any aspiring
lawyer.9 But each of the American editions of Blackstone was
merely a reprint of Blackstone's original work; none offered any
consideration of the extent to which American law differed from
English law.10
Tucker's Blackstone took an entirely different course. While
serving as a law professor at The College of William and Mary
during the 1790s, Tucker had his students read Blackstone, but he
supplemented that reading with lectures in which he analyzed the
ways that law in the United States-and specifically, Virginia
-had departed from English legal principles as a result of the
American Revolution, the Virginia Constitution, and the United
States Constitution." These lectures were "the first systematic
effort by any figure in American law to describe the contours of the
new system created by the amended Constitution."'2 Drawing
extensively on his William and Mary lectures, Tucker's Blackstone
included eight hundred pages of essays on a variety of legal and
political topics and more than one thousand footnotes in which
Tucker examined Blackstone in light of American and Virginian
law.'3  Tucker worried about the effect Blackstone's Tory
sensibilities might have on his students. 4 He thus emphasized to
his students that the American Revolution and its aftermath had
produced a revolution "not only in the principles of our
9. Id.; 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 4, at iv; Douglas, supra note
3, at 203; Hobson, supra note 5, at 1247.
10. Finkelman & Cobin, supra note 4, at i.
11. Douglas, supra note 3, at 203-04. Tucker explained to his students that the American
Revolution had "produced a corresponding revolution not only in the principles of our
government, but in the laws which relate to property, and in a variety of other [laws] ...
irreconcilable to the principles contained in the Commentaries."' Michael Grossberg, Citizens
and Families: A Jeffersonian Vision of Domestic Relations and Generational Change, in
THOMAS JEFFERSONAND THE EDUCATION OFA CITIZEN 19 (James Gilreath ed., 1999) (quoting
1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 4, at iv-vi). For example, Tucker noted
that the United States had rejected English notions of the nature of sovereignty, claiming
that the exercise of political authority was conditioned on the right of participation by the
people. Cover, supra note 6, at 1477-79.
12. Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original
Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1123, 1147 (2006).
13. Finkleman & Cobin, supra note 4, at i; Cover, supra note 6, at 1475-76.
14. Grossberg, supra note 11, at 19.
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government," but in a variety of legal principles, such as the law of
inheritance, that reflected the new nation's republican values and
that rendered Blackstone an unreliable guide to certain aspects of
American law.i"
Tucker's edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, known as
"America's Blackstone," soon became the leading legal text in the
United States, enjoying wide circulation throughout the country.' 6
Indeed, Tucker's Blackstone, the first major legal treatise on
American law, was one of the most influential legal works of the
early nineteenth century and the most comprehensive treatise on
American constitutional law until around 1820."7 Not surprisingly,
it was also one of the legal texts most frequently cited by the United
States Supreme Court and relied upon by lawyers appearing before
the Court during the first few decades of the nineteenth century. 8
As Saul Cornell notes in his contribution to this symposium,
15. 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 4, at iv; Grossberg, supra note
11, at 19. Of these legal changes that reflected "a desire to conform" the nation's laws "to the
newly adopted principles of republican government," Tucker cited
the ABOLITION of entails; of the right of primogeniture; of the preference
heretofore given to the male line, in respect to real estates of inheritance; and
ofjus accrescendi, or right of survivorship between joint-tenants; the ascending
quality communicated to real estates; the heretability of the half-blood; and of
bastards; the legitimation of the latter, in certain cases; and many other
instances in which the rules of the COMMON LAW, or the provisions of a
statute, are totally changed.
1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 4, at x-xi. Tucker offered a republican
rationale for many of these changes. Of the abolition of entail, for example, Tucker explained
that
when the revolution took place, a different mode of thinking succeeded; it was
found that entails would be the means of accumulating and preserving great
estates in certain families, which would, not only introduce all the evils
complained of in England, but be utterly incompatible with the genius and
spirit of our constitution and government.
3 id. at 119-20 ed. n.14. See generally Grossberg, supra note 11, at 19-22 (describing the
republican focus of Tucker's Blackstone).
16. See Hobson, supra note 5, at 1247. According to Michael Grossberg, "Tucker's
Blackstone quickly became a staple of the antebellum bar. Law students were weaned on it,
established practitioners relied on it." Grossberg, supra note 11, at 21.
17. David Thomas Konig, St. George Tucker and the Limits of States' Rights
Constitutionalism: Understanding the Federal Compact in the Early Republic, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1279, 1280 (2006). See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, 3-4 HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURTAND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-
1835, at 86-95 (1988).
18. CULLEN, supra note 2, at 162-63.
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'Tucker was one of the leading legal thinkers of the Founding Era,
and his magisterial study of Blackstone's Commentaries was an
influential work of constitutional theory that helped shape the
terms of constitutional discourse in the early republic."1C Because
Tucker wrote many of the essays that appeared in his edition of
Blackstone during the early 1790s, and was quite familiar with the
ratification controversy and the contemporary debates over the Bill
of Rights, his essays on the Constitution offer a fascinating
eighteenth-century perspective on the meaning of our central
constitutional texts.2 °
Tucker's Blackstone would continue to be read and cited by
lawyers and jurists as an authoritative treatment of certain aspects
of American law until after the Civil War.21 Even today, it remains
"an indispensable source for understanding American law and the
Constitution in their formative era."22 The United States Supreme
Court, for example, has cited Tucker's Blackstone in more than forty
cases as authority for eighteenth-century understandings of certain
points of law 2 -including recent cases addressing state sovereign
immunity and the ability of states to impose term limits on
members of Congress. 24 Tucker's Blackstone was republished in
1969 and again in 1996.25
Tucker's importance to legal historians, however, goes beyond the
publication of his edition of Blackstone. During his more than thirty
years as a state and federal court judge, Tucker kept copious notes
on the hundreds of cases on which he ruled. These include his
papers as a state court judge from 1788 to 1811 and as a federal
court judge from 1813 to 1824. In total, Tucker preserved his notes,
19. Cornell, supra note 12, at 1124.
20. Id. at 1125.
21. Cover, supra note 6, at 1476.
22. Hobson, supra note 5, at 1247.
23. Finkelman & Cobin, supra note 4, at v-vi.
24. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 778 n.18 (1999) (citing Tucker for the
eighteenth-century concern that states have immunity from suit in federal court); U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 799, 824 n.34 (1995) (discussing Tucker's criticism of
state laws that add additional qualifications for service in Congress); Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 977 (1991) (citing Tucker for eighteenth-century understandings of
proportionality in punishments).
25. See TUCKER, BLAcKSTONE's COMMENTARIES, supra note 4. Tucker's Blackstone is also
available online at httD://www.heinonline.orL/HOLIAndex?index=beal/bctv&collection=beal
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legal memoranda, and opinions from nearly eleven hundred cases.26
Given the paucity of officially reported judicial decisions in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, these papers are
valuable sources of judicial decision making in the early republic.
In his contribution to this symposium, Charles Hobson explores the
significance of these legal papers, describing them as a "legal
archive that is virtually unsurpassed as a source for documenting
the 'Americanization' of the common law as it unfolded in the
republican Commonwealth of Virginia in the decades following the
American Revolution."27
Tucker's views on certain legal issues-as set forth in his edition
of Blackstone, his judicial opinions, and other writings-are of
particular interest to contemporary scholars. The contributors to
this symposium explore Tucker's views on a variety of issues,
including the Second Amendment, states' rights, slavery, judicial
review, and the status of women.
Saul Cornell's article probes Tucker's views on the Second
Amendment-and criticizes the view held by many scholars that
Tucker supported an individual rights theory of the Amendment.2 s
Cornell argues that Tucker's views on the Second Amendment must
be seen in the context of the late-eighteenth-century debate
between Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the scope of federal
power:29
Tucker's earliest commentary on the Second Amendment does
not support the individual rights view [of the Amendment].
Indeed, in his unpublished law lectures, Tucker not only
explicitly described the Second Amendment as a right of the
states, but he noted that its inclusion in the Constitution was
designed to assuage Anti-Federalists' fears about the
Constitution's power over the militia.... Tucker's earliest
26. Hobson, supra note 5, at 1250-51.
27. Id. at 1276.
28. Cornell, supra note 12, at 1125.
29. Id. at 1131. Cornell argues, for example, that for Tucker-and Joseph Story-"the
Second Amendment had been part ofa compromise between Federalists andAnti-Federalists
designed to reaffirm state control of the militia and neutralize the fear that the militia might
be disarmed." Id. at 1132.
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writings about the Second Amendment challenge the often-
repeated claim that the states' rights theory of the Second
Amendment is a modern invention quite alien to the Founding
Era.3 °
Cornell goes on to note that Tucker's views on the Second
Amendment evolved over time. Ultimately, concludes Cornell, "[h]is
writings fit neither the modern collective or individual rights
models [of the Second Amendment].... [Iln his more mature
writings, Tucker approached the right to bear arms as both a right
of the states and as a civic right."3
The issue of states' rights was clearly central to Tucker's
concerns. Robert Cover has appropriately described Tucker as "the
first of the states' rights commentators upon the Constitution."32
Although in his article for this symposium David Konig concedes
that such a "states' rights" characterization of Tucker is
appropriate, he argues that the meaning of "states' rights" for
Tucker is far more complex than many scholars have assumed.33
Konig notes that the conventional portrait of Tucker is "as an
unyielding champion of states' rights constitutionalism and a jurist
whose writings laid the basis for secession as the remedy for
violations of the federal compact."34 Konig disputes that view and
offers a revisionist account, arguing that Tucker's
thinking about the federal compact and the delegation of powers
to the federal government was more complex and nuanced than
the uses to which others put it decades later, and that
dissolution of the union-while theoretically available as a right
of the states-was so disturbing to him as a practical matter
that he made every effort to urge alternative constitutional
remedies for abuses of federal authority.35
Kurt Lash, in his contribution to this symposium, probes another
aspect of St. George Tucker's thoughts about the relationship
30. Id. at 1125.
31. Id. at 1126.
32. Cover, supra note 6, at 1488.
33. Konig, supra note 17, at 1282.
34. Id. at 1279.
35. Id.
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between the states and the federal government in the context of
Tucker's rule of strict construction of federal power.3" Lash
summarizes this view:
Tucker ... saw the Constitution as a compact entered into by the
independent sovereign people of the several states.... As
independent sovereigns, any agreements entered into by the
states [such as the U.S. Constitution] should be read with the
presumption that the states retained their sovereign powers in
all matters not expressly delegated to the federal government. 37
In taking that view, Tucker relied on the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments to the Constitution, which he believed "worked
together as co-guardians of a federalism-based concept of popular
sovereignty."3 Lash's article on Tucker's rule of strict construction
should bring continued attention to the Ninth Amendment and its
role in American constitutional jurisprudence. 9
Tucker is also of interest as one of the only southerners of his
generation to offer a specific plan to eliminate slavery.4" In 1796,
Tucker wrote A Dissertation on Slavery; With a Proposal for the
Gradual Abolition of It, in the State of Virginia,4 which he
presented to the state legislature. Michael Kent Curtis and Paul
Finkelman, in their contributions to this symposium, examine that
plan, which the legislature ignored, and Tucker's views on slavery.42
Though a slaveowner himself, Tucker recognized the horrors of
slavery:
Whilst America hath been the land of promise to Europeans,
and their descendants, it hath been the vale of death to millions
36. Kurt T. Lash, "Tucker's Rule'" St. George Tucker and the Limited Construction of
Federal Power, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1343 (2006).
37. Id. at 1349-50.
38. Id. at 1350.
39. Lash builds on his recent work on the Ninth Amendment. See Kurt T. Lash, The Lost
Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 597 (2005); Kurt T. Lash, The Lost
Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331 (2004).
40. Paul Finkelman, The Dragon St. George Could Not Slay: Tucker's Plan to End
Slavery, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1213, 1216 (2006).
41. CULLEN, supra note 2, at 149.
42. Michael Kent Curtis, St. George Tucker and the Legacy of Slavery, 47 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1157 (2006); Finkelman, supra note 40.
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of the wretched sons of Africa .... Whilst we were offering up
vows at the shrine of liberty ... we were imposing upon our
fellow men, who differ in complexion from us, a slavery, ten
thousand times more cruel than the utmost extremity of those
grievances and oppressions of which we complained. Such are
the inconsistencies of human nature ....
Tucker went on to claim "how perfectly irreconcilable a state of
slavery is to the principles of a democracy, which, form the basis
and foundation of our government."44 Despite these obvious tensions
between slavery and the central principles of democratic
government, Tucker did not favor immediate emancipation and did
not emancipate his own slaves.45 Instead, he put forth a gradual
plan whereby slavery would not end in its entirety for more than a
century and freed slaves would not enjoy the same civil rights as
whites.46 For Tucker, immediate emancipation and full equality
were not practical: "Unfit for their new condition, and unwilling to
return to their former laborious course, they would become the
caterpillars of the earth, and the tygers [sic] of the human race."47
As Curtis notes, Tucker therefore sought "a middle course between
immediate emancipation and full equality on one hand and
continuance of chattel slavery on the other."4 Both Curtis and
Finkelman probe the inherent contradictions in Tucker's life and
thought on the issue of slavery.
Tucker also played a role in the development of judicial review.
In the famous case of Commonwealth v. Caton,4 9 in which the
Virginia Court of Appeals employed judicial review to strike down
a Virginia statute as inconsistent with the state constitution in
43. St. George Tucker, On the State of Slavery in Virginia, in 2 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 4, ed. app. at 31 [hereinafter Tucker, State of Slavery].
44. Id. ed. app. at 54.
45. Finkelman, supra note 40, at 1221-22, 1236-39.
46. CULLEN, supra note 2, at 151.
47. Tucker, State of Slavery, supra note 43, ed. app. at 70.
48. Curtis, supra note 42, at 1166.
49. 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 8 (1782) (striking down a Virginia statute dealing with the issuance
of pardons as inconsistent with the Virginia Constitution, noting that if the "whole
legislature ... should attempt to overleap the bounds, prescribed to them by the people [in the
constitution], I, in administering the public justice of the country, will meet the united
powers, at my seat in this tribunal; and, pointing to the constitution, will say, to them, here
is the limit of your authority; and hither, shall you go, but no further").
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1782, Tucker appeared as an amicus, urging the court to exercise
judicial review.5 ° In his contribution to this symposium, Charles
Hobson discusses Tucker's subsequent exercise of judicial review.5
In Kamper v. Hawkins,5 2 a case before the Virginia General Court
in 1793, Tucker and the four other members of the court issued
opinions in which they concluded that the court was obligated to
exercise judicial review when a state statute violated the Virginia
Constitution. Tucker described a constitution as "a rule to all the
departments of the government, to the judiciary as well as to the
legislature"5 -- language evocative of that which Chief Justice John
Marshall would deploy in his 1803 opinion in Marbury v. Madison.54
Ironically, as Hobson notes, one of the lawyers who argued Kamper
v. Hawkins before the General Court was Marshall.5 5 In 1800, in
another General Court decision, Woodson v. Randolph,56 Tucker
again exercised judicial review, finding that Congress exceeded its
powers under Article I of the U.S. Constitution when it enacted
legislation requiring that bonds be issued on stamped paper.5 7
Hence, as other scholars have noted, judicial review did not
originate with the Supreme Court's Marbury decision.5"
Finally, Mark McGarvie, in his article for this symposium,
examines various cases in which Tucker construed the rights of
women to hold and convey property as well as some of Tucker's
unpublished writings on the topic. 9 McGarvie concludes that
Tucker's "personal and judicial expressions of women's rights evince
50. CULLEN, supra note 2, at 36; Hobson, supra note 5, at 1274. For a discussion of
Tucker's view on judicial review, see William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and
the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 491, 522-29 (1994).
51. Hobson, supra note 5, at 1276.
52. 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793).
53. Hobson, supra note 5, at 1274.
54. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
55. Hobson, supra note 5, at 1275.
56. 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 128 (1800).
57. Hobson, supra note 5, at 1275-76. Tucker wrote in dissent; a majority of judges held
the legislation within Congress's power to lay and collect taxes and to make all laws
necessary and proper for exercising its enumerated powers. Id.
58. For a summary of the evidence for the acceptance ofjudicial review prior to Marbury,
see Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the "Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L.
REv. 1111, 1113-17 (2001).
59. Mark Douglas McGarvie, Transforming Society Through Law: St. George Tucker,
Women's Property Rights, and an Active Republican Judiciary, 47WM. &MARYL. REV. 1393
(2006).
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an unusually progressive perspective that places him in the
vanguard of social and legal reform in the early republic."6 In
putting forth this thesis, McGarvie challenges the conclusions
drawn in earlier works on Tucker 1 and challenges scholars of the
early republic "to reconsider the profundity of legal reform actually
achieved by the Republican leadership." 2
St. George Tucker has been eclipsed in prominence by other
nineteenth-century jurists and legal scholars, but his contributions
to the development of American law are nevertheless significant.
This symposium seeks to renew scholarly interest in one of the
more compelling jurists, legal scholars, and legal educators of early
America.
60. Id. at 1393.
61. Id. McGarvie challenges, for example, the views expressed in Christopher Doyle,
Judge St. George Tucker and the Case of Tom v. Roberts: Blunting the Revolution's
Radicalism from Virginia's District Courts, 106 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 419 (1998).
62. McGarvie, supra note 59, at 1395-96.
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